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Abstract. - Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental
problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game
theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is network reciprocity, where the
interaction patterns and opportunities for strategy spread of agents are constrained to limited
sets of permanent interactions partners. Cooperation survives because it is possible for close-
knit communities of cooperation to be shielded from invasion by defectors. Here we show that
parameter ranges in which cooperation can survive are strongly expanded if game play on networks
is skewed towards more frequent interactions with more successful neighbours. In particular,
if agents exclusively select neighbors for game play that are more successful than themselves,
cooperation can even dominate in situations in which it would die out if interaction neighbours
were chosen without a bias or with a preference for less successful opponents. We demonstrate
that the “selecting fitter neighbours” strategy is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, it will emerge
as the dominant strategy out of an initially random population of agents.
Introduction. – A variety of social- and non-social
organisms display altruism [11]. Altruism describes the
ability to cooperate for joint benefit even at a cost to the
individual. This scenario has frequently been studied by
the prisoner’s dilemma [12], in which two individuals si-
multaneously make a decision to cooperate (C) or defect
(D). Cooperation gives a benefit b to the recipient, but
comes at a cost c to the donor. Introducing the cost-
benefit ratio r = c/(b − c) and normalizing, a frequently
used parametrization of the game is that mutual cooper-
ation is rewarded by R = 1 for both players. A coop-
erator interacting with a defector receives S = −r while
the defector obtains a payoff T = 1 + r. Mutual defec-
tion results in the same payoff P = 0 for both opponents.
For 0 < r < 1 payoffs are ranked T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S, such that for one player independent of the
other player’s strategy, defection always results in a bet-
ter outcome. The inferiority of the payoff for one-sided
or mutual defection to mutual cooperation constitutes the
dilemma setting.
The evolution of cooperation is conveniently studied in
the framework of evolutionary game theory [2]. One con-
siders a population of agents whose strategies spread in
the population according to their success in game play.
Because defectors always earn larger payoffs than cooper-
ators, cooperation cannot survive in well-mixed situations
in which agents can interact with all other agents in the
population. In this case defection is the evolutionarily sta-
ble strategy. As shown by studies of evolutionary games in
space [3,4,6] and more recently on other types of complex
networks [5, 7–10, 16, 17] the dominance of defection can
be reduced if interaction patterns are restricted to a finite
set of permanent opponents. Limited interaction patterns
are conveniently described by spatial grids or complex net-
works such as scale-free or small-world networks [13, 14].
On a network, agents interact in playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game with their network neighbours. Strategy
evolution is described by a process whereby agents can
adopt the strategies of better performing neighbours. In
such a setting cooperators can form tightly-knit clusters of
cooperation that are shielded from the invasion of defec-
tors. Nevertheless, even though cooperation is boosted by
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network reciprocity, for instance in the spatial game only
limited numbers of cooperators can survive for a rather
restricted range of dilemma strengths [15].
Recent results on the evolution of cooperation on com-
plex networks [5, 7–10, 16–18] have added substantial in-
sight to the above statement. In particular, in situations
in which some agents have the potential to earn substan-
tially larger payoffs than others [9, 10, 19, 20], cooperation
can be strongly enhanced, but is still not dominant in all
possible game settings.
A mechanism to boost cooperation even on regular
graphs similar to the heterogeneity in potential payoffs on
heterogenous networks is via different degrees of effective-
ness in spreading individual agents strategies’ [22], which
can also be modelled as wealth accumulation of agents
[20]. In a similar vein to our study and probably inspired
by earlier work on dynamic rules for strategy selection [23]
also the aspiration of agents to perform better has been
modelled in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma game
[24,25]. In their simulations, Wang and Perc assume that
depending on aspiration levels agents preferentially select
certain neighbours as potential targets to copy strategies.
The procedure and additional heterogeneity in aspiration
levels have been shown to further enhance cooperation.
Different to these previous studies [23–25] the present Let-
ter does not consider aspirations in the strategy adapta-
tion process. Instead, we focus on the infuence of the
strength of biases in the selection of game partners on the
evolution of cooperation on fixed contact networks. In a
series of controlled computer experiments we demonstate
that a strong positive bias to preferentially interact with
successful players strongly promotes cooperation.
The Model. – Here we study a simple model of game
partner selection on networks. As in the standard ap-
proach, contact networks define sets of potential interac-
tion partners and candidates for strategy adoption. How-
ever, we assume that agents do not necessarily engage in
game play with all of their network neighbours with the
same likelihood, but may have a preference to select oppo-
nents for game play that are more or less successful than
themselves. The success of an agent x in playing the game
is measured by its payoff Px from game interactions. In
biological problems payoff translates into an individual’s
fitness which is often apparent in the invidual’s physical
appearance and might thus be easily judged by competi-
tors.
Formally, we consider a model in which agents select
game partners with a probability Pselect proportional to
payoff differences to neighbours, i.e.
Pselect(z) ∝
1
1 + exp(w(Pz − Px))
. (1)
The parameter w describes the preference of an agent to
play against stronger (w < 0) or weaker (w > 0) neigh-
bours. The case of no preference for game partner se-
lection (w = 0) corresponds to the setting in which each
agent plays against all of its neighbours which is conven-
tionally studied in the literature. But note that there is an
important difference: even in unbiased probabilistic game
partner selection not the whole neighbourhood of poten-
tial game partners might be explored and some agents
can have more opportunities for game play than others.
In the limits w → +∞(−∞) strategy choice simplifies to
exclusively playing against weaker (stronger) opponents.
In our setting, each agent probabilistically selects an op-
ponent for game play as many times as it has neighbours.
In each interaction, the focal and the selected player earn
payoffs from playing the prisoner’s dilemma game. Ac-
cumulated payoffs are then determined by counting each
agent’s payoffs, i.e. summing over payoffs from games in
which the agent itself selected game partners and from
games in which the agent was selected as a game partner.
In a second step strategies are updated after each round
of game play. This is modelled in the conventional way.
Every agent randomly selects one of its neighbours and
adopts the strategy of the neighbour with a probability
determined by payoff differences
Padopt ∝ 1/(1 + exp((Pz − Px)/K))). (2)
The parameter K gives the noise in the strategy selec-
tion process [15] and we set K = 0.1 in the presented
simulation experiments, but qualitatively similar results
can be obtained for deterministic strategy adoption. Af-
ter initializing the population with equal shares of ran-
domly positioned cooperators and defectors, the iterated
game play and strategy adaptation procedure is typically
repeated for T = 105 generations of system updates until
a quasistationary state has been reached. Then averages
are calculated over a further T generations to determine
average fractions of cooperators.
In the above procedure we chose a synchronous updat-
ing scheme because it gave faster convergence. Differences
in synchronous and asynchronous updating can strongly
influence results, particularly in purely deterministic sim-
ulations [21]. To address this problem we also made sure
that the synchronous procedure does not bias the princi-
pal result. Qualitatively very similar outcomes are found
for asynchronous updating.
Simulations were conducted for systems comprised of
N = 105 − 106 agents and results were averaged over be-
tween 10 (random graphs) and 100 (scale-free networks)
realizations of the network topology when random net-
works are investigated. The fractions of average cooper-
ators shown below represent averages over time (in the
quasistationary state) and over different network realiza-
tions and initial conditions.
Results. – Figure 1 summarizes some key results
highlighting the influence of game partner selection on the
evolution of cooperation on various classes of networks.
On spatial grids we find that playing the game with strong
preference for weaker opponents does not allow for the sur-
vival of any cooperators. Likewise, without preference in
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Fig. 1: Dependence of the stationary number of cooperators Fc on the cost-benefit ratio r. Compared are simulation results on:
(a) lattices and regular random graphs (rrg) (b) scale-free networks and (c) scale-free networks and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs
(ER) with payoffs normalized by degree. Notably, without game partner preference, no cooperation can be maintain beyond
rc = 0.005 (lattices) or rc = 0.013 (regular random graph) and thresholds are rc = 0 in (a) and (c) for all classes of networks
when preferences are for weaker opponents. The corresponding thresholds for strong game partner selection are rc = 0.167 and
rc = 0.25 for lattices and regular random graphs. Note also for strong game partner selection for r < rc complete cooperation
prevails. The effect is also visible for scale-free networks, where cooperation is not completely subdued even if w→∞.
game partner selection for r > rc = 0.005 no coopera-
tor can survive. These thresholds are lower than the re-
spective thresholds for deterministic game play against all
neighbours. The reason for this is that probabilistic game
partner selection undermines cooperation in cases where a
cooperator is surrounded by many defectors and only few
cooperators. In some rounds of game play the focal coop-
erator may then lack support from the interactions with
the adjacent cooperators and is thus easier overwhelmed
by large numbers of defectors in its surrounding.
This diminished ability of cooperators to survive with
neutral selection is in stark contrast to the case of strong
preference for the selection of stronger opponents. In the
latter case cooperation dominates strongly up to cost ben-
efit ratios of rc = 0.16. A systematic investigation of the
dependence of the critical point above which cooperation
cannot surive on the preference parameter w is illustrated
in Fig. 2. The systematic shift of the critical point rc
at which cooperators go extinct with increasing bias w to
select stronger game partners further supports our asser-
tion.
Qualitatively similar results also hold for other classes
of contact networks, e.g. for regular graphs or scale-free
networks. This is independent of whether hub nodes can
achieve larger payoffs than low degree nodes (which is
known to be an effect that strongly promotes cooperation
[9,10]) or whether payoffs are normalized by degree (which
diminishes the advantage of heterogenous networks [7]).
However, it is important to stress that the boost for coop-
erators is limited to sparse networks and won’t be found
in a well-mixed population in which no shielded pockets
of cooperators can form.
At the first glance these results may appear counterintu-
itive. One would assume that defectors can achieve larger
payoffs and hence conclude that game partner selection
for strong opponents might favour game play with defec-
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Fig. 2: Phase diagram for a lattice (N = 10000, K = 0.1). In-
creasing −w allows cooperation to be maintained in an increas-
ingly larger area of parameter space. Likewise, the transition
becomes increasingly steeper and for large −w is is virtually
steplike between full and no cooperation.
tor nodes. This would then imply an additional advantage
for defectors which would reinforce their dominance. This
argument certainly holds in well-mixed populations, but
becomes invalid for ordered arrangements of cooperators
and defectors. Once clusters of cooperators have formed,
selection for strong game partners can effectively shield
clusters of cooperators from the invasion of defectors. This
is so because cooperators within the cluster attract inter-
actions with cooperators at the cluster’s boundary. In this
way payoffs of cooperator nodes inside the cluster and at
its fringe are enhanced and interactions with defectors are
avoided. Similarly, for defectors surrounding clusters of
p-3
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Fig. 3: Illustration of the flow of selection probabilities from
game partner selection. The figure represents a 20× 20 lattice
with periodic boundary conditions, white boxes symbolize de-
fectors and black boxes cooperators. Lines give the likelihood
to select the linked neighbours for game play: white lines cor-
respond to selection with probability zero and black lines game
partner selection with probability one. Black dots indicate the
respective reference nodes whose selection preferences the lines
indicate.
cooperators the effect limits opportunities for exploitation,
which opens up the way for clusters of cooperators to ex-
pand. This is illustrated in Fig. 3, which gives a snapshot
view of the flow of game partner selection preferences.
In a similar vein it is easy to understand why the “select-
ing weaker opponents” strategy undermines cooperation.
Whereas it helps cooperators to seek out fellow coopera-
tors for interactions in an initially well-mixed population
it also allows defectors to avoid interactions with other
defectors and thus helps them find cooperators to exploit.
The latter effect together with enhanced exploitation of
fringe cooperators in ordered populations explains the in-
effectiveness of the strategy.
Another argument why “playing stronger opponents”
supports cooperation is related to the boost cooperators
experience from heterogeneous settings [9, 10, 19, 20]. As
the strategy spread is a process of replacement of less
successful strategies by more successful ones, “playing
stronger opponents” effectively modifies network topology
and enhances game play between pairs of agents between
which frequent strategy copying takes place. In this way, a
successful defector undermines its own success quickly by
first attracting interactions that further enhance its suc-
cess, but then quickly spreading its strategy to its neigh-
bours who defect in interactions with it. Contrariwise, the
process enhances support for a successful cooperator.
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Fig. 5: The evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game from initially random game partner preference. (a) Evo-
lution of the frequency of cooperators. (b) Evolution of the
average preference of the population, error bars indicate the
variance and (c-e) Histograms for the distribution of game part-
ner selection preferences in the population at differentstages of
the evolution, i.e. after t = 10, 100 and 1500 steps.
For some biological applications milder dilemma set-
tings than the prisoner’s dilemma are of interest (see [6]
and references therein). A typical scenario is described by
the snow-drift game, which is characterized by a ranking
of payoffs T > R > S > P . Due to the changes of S and P
in payoff rankings some proportion of cooperators can sur-
vive even in well-mixed populations. The snow-drift game
is also of interest, since network reciprocity does not nec-
essarily enhance cooperation compared to the well-mixed
case [6]. We explored the parameter range of snow-drift
dilemma games on various classes of networks. For all
investigated situations, spatial, small-world and scale-free
networks we find that game partner selection with a bias
towards strong opponents substantially enhances the num-
ber of surviving cooperators, see figure 4.
Evolution of biases. – Let us consider an experi-
ment in which we start with a population in which no bias
for game partner selection exists. Initially every agent is
either a defector or a cooperator with equal probability
and might also have some individual bias for game part-
ner preference. This can be modelled by an individual
preference parameter wi that is initialized from a uniform
distribution over the intervall [−1, 1]. Assume that the
game partner selection preference is hereditary (similar
to the evolution of strategies). Would a systematic game
partner preference in the population evolve? And if so, in
the face of invasions of new agents with randomly selected
game partner preference and strategy profile, would it be
stable?
Following similar approaches like [24, 26] we systemati-
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Fig. 4: Evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. Comparison of rules with w = 1000 (up triangles), w = 0 (circles), and
w = −1000 (boxes) for (a) regular grids, (b) regular random networks and (c) scale-free networks.
cally addressed these questions in a number of computer
experiments. To study the evolution of game opponent se-
lection preferences we initialize a population of agents ran-
domly, attributing every agent with a strategy for game
play (cooperation or defection) and an individual game
partner selection preference wi ∈ [−1, 1]. Game play and
strategy updating were modelled as above with three im-
portant differences. First, agents select game partners
as determined by their individual preference wi. Second,
in the strategy adaptation process agents not only adopt
their neighbours’ strategies for game play but also their
respective game partner selection preferences. Third, we
introduced a small chance for mutations. After strategy
updating with small probability q = 10−3 an agent will as-
sume a randomly selected combination of game play strat-
egy and game partner selection preference.
Figure 5 illustrates a typical outcome and gives several
snapshots during the evolution. After half of the popu-
lation was seeded with cooperators their frequency drops
quickly in the initial timesteps of the simulation. The drop
occurs because of the initially random mixing in which no
pockets of cooperators have evolved yet. During this stage
of the evolution game preferences are uniform and there
is yet no bias for selecting stronger opponents. However,
already after 100 sweeps of updates cooperators have re-
covered to occupy half of the population and the distribu-
tion of w’s exhibits a strong bias towards negative values.
The bias becomes stronger as cooperation thrives more
and more and the distribution of w’s only retains a tail
towards positive values of w since we allowed for inva-
sions of agents with randomly selected strategy profiles
with a small rate q = 10−3 per site update. These ran-
dom invasions also prevent the system from reaching full
cooperation.
A closer investigation reveals the mechanism by which
game partner preferences come to dominate from random
strategy distributions. Clearly, by the above arguments
cooperators at the fringe of pockets of cooperation fare
better if they select for strong game opponents. Coopera-
tors with differing biases will be likely to either be invaded
by defectors or to copy the strategy of other cooperators
with negative bias in w since the latter tend to fare better.
Thus cooperation is reinforced and can spread. Coopera-
tors within pockets of cooperation can initially sustain a
neutral or positive game partner selection bias, but will
be subject to the same selective pressure if they become
fringe nodes when mutations towards defection occur in
their neighbourhood.
These simulations emphasise two important points.
First, preferences in game partner selection will evolve
from random initial configurations under very mild as-
sumptions. Second, once evolved, they are evolutionarily
stable and even robust in the presence of substantial noise,
either in the strategy updating process or from random in-
vasions of defectors.
Conclusions. – In summary, we have demonstrated
that a simple rule for game partner selection can signifi-
cantly enhance the support for cooperation on networks.
The simple and biologically plausible rule to play pref-
erentially against better-off opponents concentrates game
play interactions within clusters of cooperators and thus
strengthens them against invasions by defectors. This sim-
ple rule is found to be valid on all investigated classes of
networks and boosts cooperation independent of whether
payoffs are normalized by agent’s individual numbers of
interactions per round or not.
In comparison to the case of deterministic game play
against all neighbours the rule not only significantly shifts
the critical parameter rc that demarcates the parameter
region where cooperation can persist, but also allows co-
operation to dominate below the threshold. The effect is
particularly pronounced for strong game partner prefer-
ences on lattices, on which cooperators can take over the
entire population for r < rc.
As a further point we also investigated the emergence
and evolution of game partner preferences. We demon-
strated that the ‘playing against fitter opponents’ rule can
emerge dominant even from a randomly composed start-
ing population consisting of equal shares of agents with
positive and negative preferences. These results point to
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the potential importance of biases in opponent selection
and complement recent research on aspiration levels of
agent populations. Preliminary results point out that via
a suitable combination of game partner preferences and
aspiration biases any prisoner’s dilemma situation can be
resolved such that cooperation takes over the entire popu-
lation. A more detailed investigation of the latter situation
is left for future work.
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